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Abstract
On February 15, 1905, the mass-circulation Petit Parisien reported that one 
Georges Toquet, a colonial administrator, had been charged with “assassination and 
violence against several natives” from the French Congo. The following day all the 
major Parisian papers and several provincial ones led with a much larger story of 
what the Petit Parisien was already calling France’s “Scandales Coloniaux”. Two 
colonial administrators “laid their hands on a young black man, whom they bound 
tightly with rope”. They then inserted “a stick of dynamite… in the African’s anus 
and blew him up”.
The structure and style of these stories closely resembled the typical fait divers, or 
miscellaneous (crime) story, of the Belle Epoque. Only, unlike most mainland faits 
divers, the Congo story had potentially serious political consequences. “It was the prel-
ude”, as the Petit Parisien declared, “to an enormous scandal in the colonial world”.
Sociologists define scandal as an event that implicates important people and often 
members of the government. It involves transgressions, or perceived transgressions, 
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against widely accepted moral standards and as such could call the reputations of key 
individuals into question. Scandals could change the relations of power in a society, or 
reaffirm existing values and mores. Although the Congo scandal would ultimately serve 
to reinforce prevailing ideas about the merits of colonialism in France, government offi-
cials could not, at the outset, be confident that such would be the case.
Keywords
Scandal; France; Congo; atrocities; colonialism.
Resumen
El 15 de febrero de 1905 el periódico de gran circulación Le Petit Parisien 
informó de que un administrador colonial, de nombre Georges Toquet, había sido 
acusado del cargo de «asesinato y violencia contra varios nativos» en el Congo fran-
cés. Al día siguiente, los principales periódicos de París, así como muchos otros de 
provincias, aportaron más detalles sobre un asunto al que Le Petit parisien se refería 
ya como a los «escándalos coloniales» de Francia. Dos administradores coloniales «se 
abalanzaron sobre un joven negro, a quien ataron fuertemente con una cuerda». A 
continuación insertaron «un cartucho de dinamita… en el ano del africano y lo 
hicieron saltar por los aires».
La estructura y estilo de este tipo de historias se asemeja a los típicos fait divers, 
o variopintas historias (de crímenes), típicas de la Belle Époque. Con la gran diferen-
cia, sin embargo, de que en comparación con la mayoría de faits divers, la historia del 
Congo tenía el potencial de acarrear consecuencias políticas profundas. «Fue el pre-
ludio», declaró Le Petit Parisien, «de un enorme escándalo en el mundo colonial».
Los sociólogos definen el escándalo como un suceso que implica a personajes 
notorios y a menudo a miembros de Gobierno. Implica un conjunto de transgresio-
nes, o por lo menos lo que es percibido como una transgresión, contra los valores 
morales predominantes en una sociedad y por ello tienen la capacidad de minar la 
reputación de los individuos afectados. Los escándalos tienen el potencial de cambiar 
el poder en una sociedad, pero también de reafirmar los valores y costumbres pre-
ponderantes. Aunque el escándalo del Congo finalmente llevaría a reforzar los argu-
mentos preexistentes sobre los méritos del colonialismo en Francia, los miembros del 
gobierno no podían estar seguros, por lo menos en un principio, de que este sería su 
desenlace final.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 15, 1905, the Petit Parisien, the daily paper boasting the 
largest circulation in the world (1.5 million), published a short front-page arti-
cle entitled “Arrestation Mysterieuse”. Details were sketchy, but the unsigned 
piece reported that a magistrate had charged one Georges Toquet with “assas-
sination and violence against several natives” from the French Congo1. 
The following day all the major Parisian papers and several provincial 
ones led with a much larger story of what the Petit Parisien was already calling 
France’s “Scandales Coloniaux”. Le Matin, circulation 900,000, got the full, 
lurid scoop. In a front-page article entitled “The Black Man’s Executioners”, 
Le Matin’s reporter narrated the details of this awful “colonial crime”. The 
previous July 14, Toqué (not Toquet) and two subordinates, Fernand-Léopold 
Gaud and Pierre Proche, decided to add a little drama to what was otherwise 
a dull celebration of France’s national holiday. “After a copious meal, lubri-
cated by frequent libations, the party-goers, inflamed all the more by the tor-
rid climate, decided to treat themselves to a filthy drunken spectacle”2. They 
laid their hands on a young black man, whom they bound tightly with rope. 
The drunkards then attached a stick of dynamite between the man’s shoulder 
blades, but before lighting the fuse, one of the revelers had a better idea. Why 
not insert the dynamite into the African’s anus and then blow him up? “The 
Negro screamed. An explosion rang out. Bloody debris, body parts, intestines 
were projected a great distance”. 
Lest readers think that this “horrifying little pleasure, this blood thirsty 
act of insanity” satisfied Toqué’s macabre lust for violence, he and his friends 
thought it would be amusing to go one step further3. Their new idea was to 
ambush another black man and unceremoniously cut off his head. After dis-
posing of the torso, Toqué dunked the head in a boiling caldron of water, the 
1 Petit Parisien (hereinafter PP), 15 February 1905.
2 Le Matin, 16 February 1905.
3 Ibid.
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better to make a delectable soup. The French administrators then invited the 
decapitated man’s friends and family to dinner, after which the sadists carried 
out the boiled head on a platter. “This new casserole,” the journalist con-
cluded, “produced the desired effect”4.
The structure and style of this article closely resembles the typical fait 
divers, or miscellaneous (crime) story, of the Belle Epoque. Like the plethora 
of articles with titles such as “Femme coupée en morceaux” (“Woman chopped 
in pieces”), Le Matin’s “The Black Man’s Executioners” focused on blood and 
guts, on the splattered body parts that made the full horror of crime palpable 
to readers avid for gory details5. 
As the audience of penny papers grew exponentially between the 
1860s and the Great War, so did coverage of crime6. Interest in violence 
and the macabre was nothing new, but only since the 1860s had the tech-
nology and know-how existed for such tales to reach a huge newly literate 
public eager to be informed and entertained. Unlike the fictional literature 
that most people had read in the past, newspapers were devoted to reality, 
to actual events occurring in the world. Hence the widespread attention to 
crime, which satisfied both the public’s interest in drama, violence, and 
gore and the journalists’ professional obligation to narrate what was hap-
pening now7. 
In reporting Toqué’s “crimes coloniales” the penny papers reproduced 
all the elements of a mainland crime story, only coverage of the Congo drama 
had potentially serious political consequences. The day after the Congo story 
broke, the Petit Parisien’s reporter wrote, “The arrest of M. Emile-Eugène-
Georges Toqué was just the prelude, it seems, to an enormous scandal in the 
4 Le Matin, 16 February 1905. Like most faits divers, the Toqué story, as reported, dif-
fered significantly from what had actually happened, although a more accurate 
account does little to exculpate the French colonial agents. The man, Papka, blown 
up with dynamite was an individual accused of murder — probably falsely — and 
already in custody. The stick of dynamite was attached to his back, not placed in his 
anus. As for the individual whose head was boiled into a “soup”, he was already dead. 
The events in question took place in 1903, not 1904. They belonged to no July 14th 
celebration, and no Europeans other than Toqué and Gaud were involved. It was the 
latter who did the dirty deed. Toqué, in bed with malarial fever, told Gaud “to do 
what he wanted” with Papka; he did not order Gaud to blow the man up. See L’Hu-
manité, 17 February 1905; Toqué (1996); Challaye (1909), and Fabre (1999). 
5 On the fait divers, see Ambroise-Rendu (2004); Auchair (1982); Perrot (1983), and 
Barthes (1964).
6 Thérenty (2007) and Kalifa (1995).
7 Thérenty (2007): 90-152.
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colonial world”8. What had begun as a fait divers now quickly earned promo-
tion to the level of scandal, a much weightier category of journalistic interest. 
Sociologists define scandal as an event that implicates important people 
and often members of the government. It involves transgressions, or perceived 
transgressions, against widely accepted moral standards and as such can call 
the reputations of key individuals into question9. Scandals can change the 
relations of power in a society, as France’s Panama controversy of the early 
1890s did, or reaffirm existing values and mores, as in the Caillaux Affair 
of 1914. 
In the Panama case, the press’s revelations that more than one hundred 
French politicians had taken bribes to disguise the impending bankruptcy of 
the Panama Canal Company produced a scandal whose consequences 
changed the balance of power in France. It boosted anti-Semitism, weakened 
the republic, and leant credibility to extremists of the nationalist right, as 
large numbers of elected officials found themselves accused of violating the 
public trust. Panama opened the way to the Dreyfus Affair, a scandal that 
threatened to rock the very foundations of the French Republic. In the Cail-
laux Affair, a scandal that began with a former prime minister’s adultery and 
ended with accusations of murder against his wife, existing conceptions of 
masculinity and femininity were reaffirmed. So were prevailing ideas about 
sexual transgression and the relationship between politics and personal life10. 
II. THE SCANDAL IN THE FRENCH CONGO
Although the Congo scandal would ultimately serve to reinforce prevail-
ing ideas about the merits of colonialism in France, government officials 
could not, at the outset, be confident that such would be the case. When jour-
nalists from the mass-circulation press aired the word “scandal” in 1905, it 
necessarily worried French leaders, who knew full well that horrible, shame-
ful things had occurred in the Congo on their watch.
If reporters were to represent Toqué’s acts as typifying a widespread 
pattern of abuse, a pattern built into the structure of French colonial rule in 
Equatorial Africa, the legitimacy of France’s colonial project, with its loudly 
proclaimed “civilizing mission” could be challenged. Such was especially 
8 PP, 16 February 1905, Italics added.
9 On scandals as media and political phenomena, see Blic and Lemieux (2005); 
Thompson (2000); Dampierre (1954), and Lull (1997).
10 Blic (2005); Blic and Lemieux (2005): 14-16, and Berenson (1992).
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true given the contemporaneous international scrutiny of King Leopold’s 
Congo Free State and the reports of atrocities committed there on a very 
large scale11. If the French Congo resembled Leopold’s Congo, how could a 
liberal republican government justify its colonial rule? How could govern-
ment leaders and ordinary people continue to ground their support for impe-
rial expansion in the moral and humanitarian comforts of the mission 
civilisatrice? For French leaders and the public at large, the greatness and 
superiority of French culture had made France uniquely responsible for nur-
turing, educating, and improving the lives of those privileged to live under 
colonial rule. The French took pride in their empire, not as an agent of con-
quest and economic exploitation but as a means of elevating and enlighten-
ing the “savage” masses of the South12. 
In response to the Congo revelations, the French government launched 
a powerful campaign to play down their significance, a campaign whose out-
come remained in doubt for nearly a year. In the competitive market of the 
penny press, scoops as sensational as this took on a life of their own, often 
resisting efforts at the highest levels to frame the narrative or change the sub-
ject. Toqué’s arrest had convinced a wide array of journalists that they had a 
big story on their hands—a story of “horrible crimes,” of crimes so “fantastic 
and bizarre” that “they seemed to emerge from the pages of Edgar Allen 
Poe”13. The resulting frenzy of attention from the press revealed examples of 
colonial violence that local administrators normally succeeded in covering 
up: the kidnapping and rape of Congolese women, the death of prisoners 
held under inhumane conditions, the harsh punishment of “rebels” and vari-
eties of forced labor, often involving portage. Such revelations, the Petit 
Parisien declared, “inspire a set of general reflections about our entire colo-
nial oeuvre”14.
To bring the story under control, the colonial ministry and pro-govern-
ment and pro-colonial newspapers claimed that such atrocities represented 
the isolated acts of “two crazy men… two lost sheep (brébis galeuses)” and not 
the “colonial crimes” of a system beset with structural flaws. They then 
11 Hochschild (1998); Mille (1905); Morel (1903), and Morel (1904).
12 Girardet (1972), and Conklin (1997). There is a large literature on violence in the 
French Empire. See, in particular, Brower (2009); Thomas (2012), and Dwyer and 
Nettelbeck (2018).
13 PP, 17 February 1905.
14 PP, 19 February 1905. In Central Africa, all goods had to be carried by human por-
ters because pack animals could not survive the diseases born by insects common to 
the region. There were no roads as yet for automobiles.
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proceeded to build a case against Toqué. The pro-government Le Matin sent 
its journalist to the administrator’s hometown, Lorient, where former teachers 
described him as a sickly adolescent, almost deformed, his habits and bearing 
highly “irregular”. The reporter asked one if he believed Toqué “capable of the 
atrocities he’s accused of?” “I don’t know and can’t say”, the instructor 
responded, “except that he wasn’t honest, even if extremely intelligent. Per-
haps he gave way in a moment of madness”15.
If Le Matin’s interviews put Toqué on trial, the more independent Petit 
Parisien expressed a large measure of doubt over his guilt. It quoted Britain’s 
“native-loving” West African Mail, a newspaper highly critical of France’s 
Congolese regime, as calling Toqué “one of France’s most humane colonial 
administrators”. Sent to the accused’s hometown, the Petit Parisien’s corre-
spondent presented him in an even more sympathetic light. Toqué was warm 
and appealing, sympathized with the Congolese, and warned that French 
policies could “lead to the extermination of the tribes in question, half of 
whose population has already been lost”. These sentiments, the correspondent 
concluded, “hardly seem compatible with those of a torturer”16.
In response, Le Matin turned its front page over to the pro-colonial dep-
uty René Le Hérissé, who concluded that men like Toqué and Gaud “consti-
tute an exception, an extremely rare exception, among our colonial 
administrators”, the vast majority of whom were “admirable for the zealous-
ness of their devotion and their abnegation”. If Toqué and Gaud’s “methods 
resembled those practiced in certain foreign colonies”, they were the excep-
tions that proved France’s humanitarian rule. “In France”, Le Hérissé declared, 
“we use a completely different method of colonization”.
Writers for the Petit Parisien seemed less certain of the difference between 
France’s colonial practices and those all too common in the Congo Free State 
next door. To investigate the story behind the Toqué-Gaud atrocities, reporters 
for the paper interviewed several anonymous sources identified only as former 
colonial officials in Africa. Virtually all of these informants maintained that 
the crimes attributed to Toqué and Gaud represented the tip of the iceberg of 
a much deeper structural problem. “What took place in Krebedjé [Toqué’s dis-
trict]”, one interviewee maintained, “happens essentially everywhere in the 
dark continent… where white torturers reign as sovereign masters over 
immense territories and populations”17. Knowledge of atrocities, “which occur 
regularly”, rarely seeped out. “My absolute belief”, the interviewee said, “is that 
15 Le Matin, 21 February 1905.
16 PP, 17 February 1905.
17 PP, 20 February 1905.
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if Toqué had not returned to France, we would have known nothing of the 
accusations against him”.
Although top officials in the colonial ministry presented French colo-
nists in the Congo as “devoted and humane”, they knew perfectly well that a 
great many were anything but. Since 1893, four successive government 
inspections of the French Congo had documented the negligence and incom-
petence of colonial officials posted there, the paucity of resources, and the 
abuses committed both by government agents and by individuals in the rub-
ber trade18. Officials also knew of the atrocities attributed to Toqué and Gaud, 
because the Congo’s commissaire general, Emile Gentil, had sent the former 
colonial minister, Gaston Doumerge, a detailed report about the affair the 
previous August19. The report had remained confidential until Toqué’s arrest 
the following February.
The Entente Cordiale with Britain, enacted the previous year, encouraged 
the French government all the more to keep the Toqué story under wraps and 
then to downplay its importance once it broke. The British government was 
already unhappy over French policy in the Congo because the French compa-
nies granted monopolies there prevented British traders from operating in the 
region. The Berlin Congress of 1885 had explicitly guaranteed free trade in 
much of what would become the Congo Free State and French Equatorial 
Africa, and British commercial interests reacted angrily to France and Belgium’s 
flagrant violations of the Berlin accords. Since the 1860s, two British firms, 
Hatton-and-Cookson and John Holt, had between them owned about half of 
the major trading stations in the Congo. Most of these stations stood in regions 
granted to the different concessionary [monopolistic] companies. When those 
companies attempted to prevent Holt from doing business and went so far as to 
confiscate his rubber in 1899, the British trader protested to his government20. 
The Times and other British papers took up the matter, as did the skillful 
humanitarian advocate E. D. Morel, who often cooperated with British com-
mercial interests in Liverpool21. Holt was not without his own humanitarian 
concerns: he saw how concessionary companies in both Congos deprived Afri-
cans of the right to harvest rubber on their own and trade directly with foreign 
merchants. The Congolese lived at the mercy of monopolistic firms.
Meanwhile, Britain’s Aborigines Protection Society, largely indifferent to 
Holt’s commercial concerns, joined him and Morel in publicly condemning 
18 Brunschwig (1977): 115-16.
19 Ibid., 116.
20 Cookey (1966): 263-64.
21 On Morel, see Louis and Stengers (1968).
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the humanitarian consequences of France’s “deplorable imitation” of the 
Congo Free State and the “manifest danger of further incalculable mischief 
ensuing”22. Given the growing international outcry against Leopold’s Congo, 
the last thing France’s republican government wanted was to share in the 
opprobrium directed against Belgium. With an international commission due 
to issue a scathing report on the Free State, the French wanted to mark as 
much distance between them and Leopold as they could23. Otherwise, the 
developing scandal could bring down the French government.
On 26 February 1905, the new minister of colonies, Etienne Clémentel, 
announced the formation of a commission charged with investigating the 
Congo situation. By taking the initiative in creating such a commission, the 
French government hoped to avoid being required to make it an international 
body, as Leopold had been forced to do. Instead, the government would be 
free to stack the commission with reliable people who would produce a favora-
ble, exculpatory report. But almost immediately, Clémentel met with an 
unanticipated problem. The docile bureaucrat Etienne Dubard, asked to head 
the commission, declined the assignment. While the colonial ministry looked 
for a replacement, the president of the Republic, who rarely intervened in day-
to-day political affairs, publicly advocated the appointment of Pierre Savor-
gnan de Brazza, the famous African explorer and first commissioner of 
France’s Congo colony.
President Loubet had long been friendly with Brazza and his family, and 
he likely knew the celebrated explorer eagerly sought a role in this affair24. But 
Brazza was the last person to whom top colonial officials wanted to turn. 
Many of them had helped engineer Brazza’s dismissal in 1898 as the Congo’s 
commissaire general, and they rightly feared he would be disinclined to make 
them look good25. Worse, the explorer’s public stature and the political author-
ity granted this charismatic figure would give him a large measure of inde-
pendence in pursuing his investigation and writing his report. With Brazza 
involved, the scandal would be hard to contain. But once the president had 
put forth his name, the Colonial Ministry had no choice but to accept it. 
Brazza was a national hero and founding father of France’s new African 
empire; to reject him would raise suspicions that there was something to hide. 
As it happened, the commission of inquiry, hastily conceived and prema-
turely announced, nearly proved a disaster for the French imperial project in 
22 Quoted in Cookey (1966).
23 Brunschwig (1977): 117 ff.
24 Martin (2005): 193. 
25 Autin (1985): 210-217.
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Central Africa. Brazza would develop serious doubts about the justice and 
morality of French colonialism in Central Africa, and perhaps elsewhere 
as well.
The popular press lauded Brazza’s 1905 appointment as head of the 
Congo Commission. In an editorial entitled “A Great Frenchman”, the Petit 
Parisien recalled the explorer’s reputation as a “pacific conqueror”, “an apostle 
of peace”, and as the Frenchman who had “acquired among the natives the 
same moral authority as Livingstone”26. Brazza was the good colonizer, the 
man who understood that the “basis of all truly lasting colonial activity was 
to improve the natives’ lives, to conciliate their interests with ours”. Thanks to 
his efforts, the Congolese had gained “such a high and pure idea of what the 
French flag represents that they wanted to take refuge within its folds”. Nei-
ther this nor any other popular article on the Brazza Commission discussed 
what steps the explorer —or the government— might take to rectify the sit-
uation in the Congo, or even to understand how and why the abuses of the 
Congolese had been allowed to occur. It was as if Brazza’s presence alone 
would “restore in our African colonies the principles of generosity that belong 
to the patrimony of France, of which Brazza, throughout his career, has been 
one of the most eminent representatives”. Because Brazza’s “name is synony-
mous with humanity and goodness”, declared the Petit Parisien, the commis-
sion needed no specific objectives. “It was enough to have charged Brazza 
with leading it”, which is why the newspaper could “loudly proclaim our con-
fidence in the mission’s success”. What exactly “success” would mean remained 
unsaid. The assumption was, as La Nature put it, that Brazza had remained 
such “a demigod among the Africans that one sign of friendship from him” 
would remind them of the goodness of French colonialism and make memo-
ries of its atrocities go away27.
Although top officials at the Ministry of Colonies publicly endorsed 
such sentiments —Brazza’s mission constituted a “new apostolate”, declared 
Clémental— in private they expressed horror over his selection28. “The 
appointment of Brazza”, wrote Gustave Binger, director of African affairs at 
the Ministry, “resulted from the idiotic press campaign in response to the 
Gaud and Toqué affairs”. Particularly worrisome to the Colonial Ministry 
was Brazza’s selection of Félicien Challaye, a young left-leaning philosopher 
and recent graduate of the elite Ecole normale supérieure, as a member of his 
26 PP, March 13, 1905. For similar comments, see PP, supplement illustré, 19 March 
1905; Les hommes du jour, 1 April 1905.
27 PP, 23 September 1905.
28 Interview with Emile Clémentel, minister of colonies, PP, 2 March 1905.
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commission of inquiry. A talented writer, Challaye had agreed to cover the 
mission for Le Temps, the quasi-official, conservative paper of record29.
To make the best of a bad situation, Clémentel directed Congo commis-
saire general Gentil not to cooperate with the Brazza inquiry. The minister 
then limited its duration to six months, including travel to and from Africa. 
He issued instructions designed to narrow the scope of the investigation and 
framed questions intended to evoke the kinds of answers the ministry wanted 
to hear. Brazza was asked, for example, to confirm that abuses were “extremely 
rare” and “limited to individual acts that cannot be seen as part of an organ-
ized system”30. The minister also instructed Brazza not to include anything in 
his final report that would provoke “a sterile theoretical discussion of the 
advantages or dangers, in the French Congo, of the concessionary system”. 
Above all, Clémentel made it clear, the commission of inquiry was to “show 
the difference between the rules that [France] applies to its possessions in the 
Congo and the methods used in the [Congo] Free State”. Brazza was to find, 
in other words, that the damning international criticism of Leopold’s Congo 
did not apply to France31.
These kinds of instructions might have succeeded with a commission 
appointed by the ministry; with Brazza, they would have only minimal effect. 
Having spent twenty years in the Congo, Brazza knew what to look for, and 
he seemed convinced that his stature and prestige, both in France and in 
Africa, would permit him to root out the violence and injustice he found32. 
Never a writer, Brazza did not produce a narrative account of his mission, but 
Challaye’s dispatches allow us to follow most of the inquiry, as do books writ-
ten after the fact by another member of the commission, Jules Saintoyant, 
and by Georges Toqué himself33.
The dozen members of the commission, including Brazza’s wife Therèse, 
left Marseille on 4 April 190534. They reached Libreville (present-day Gabon), 
a first destination of French ships heading for equatorial Africa, three weeks 
later. From the Gabon coast, the commission sailed south to the former 
slave-trading port of Loango, where Challaye reported that the men “dress 
like us, without appearing too ridiculous”35. Continuing on, they steamed 
29 Challaye collected his newspaper articles, plus other material, in Chayalle (1909).
30 Brunschwig (1977): 121-22.
31 Ibid.
32 West (1973): 177.
33 Saintoyant (1960) and Toqué (1996).
34 Coquery-Vidrovitch (1972): 172 n2, lists the ten members plus Brazza and his wife.
35 Challaye (1909): 13.
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into the mouth of the Congo River and then up the vast estuary to Matadi, 
the last town before the succession of cataracts that made the lower Congo 
impassable. From there, Brazza and company boarded the narrow-gauge Bel-
gian train that chugged slowly overland to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), cap-
ital of the Congo Free State. The four-hundred-kilometer journey took 
forty-eight hours, slow by European standards, but immeasurably faster than 
the slavers’ caravan route that travelers had had to take before Leopold com-
pleted his railroad in 1898. Once in Leopoldville, the French team took a 
ferry across the wide expanse of Stanley Pool, landing in Brazzaville on May 
16. The commission had been en voyage for six weeks, and the inquiry had yet 
to begin.
During his brief stay in the town he founded, Brazza held tense meetings 
with Gentil and the longtime Catholic bishop of the region, Monseigneur 
Augouard. Neither tried to disguise their suspicion of the former commissaire 
général nor their hostility to his mission of inspection36. Both men had things 
to hide, and they worried about what Brazza might find. The mission stayed 
in the capital only two weeks; time was short and Brazza sought to visit as 
much of the colony as possible. He wanted especially to make it to Chad, 
where he understood some of the worst atrocities had taken place.
On May 29 the group boarded a steamer for the 750-kilometer trip up 
the Congo and then the Ubangi River to the town of Bangui, capital of the 
present-day Central African Republic. From there, the Brazza group contin-
ued north, abandoning its steamer for an oar-powered whaling boat that took 
the party up the Gribingui River to a pair of the most distant outposts in 
France’s central African colony: Fort-Lamy and Fort-Crampel. This leg of the 
journey took five weeks. Saintoyant’s narrative emphasizes just how arduous 
the trip was for the typical low-level colonial administrator assigned to one of 
these forts. Petty officials, who benefited from none of the special travel 
arrangements made for the Brazza commission, spent five months in transit 
from southern France to Fort-Crampel, a trip that left them ill, exhausted, 
and numbed by the sheer discomfort of the equatorial climate.
As for the outposts themselves, inexperienced colonial administrators 
served there with only one or two other European companions and no super-
vision by any higher authority. The nearest officers were weeks or months 
away and thus incapable of exercising any effective control, even had they 
wanted to. The forts were ill equipped and uncomfortable. Colonial agents 
had to procure much of their own food, since great distances and uncertain 
36 Augouard’s diaries were edited by Witte (1924). On Gentil’s reaction to Brazza, see 
Autin (1985): 245-46. On Augouard more generally, see Mahieu (2006).
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means of travel made it extremely difficult for authorities to supply the out-
posts with sufficient provisions. There were no books or even newspapers, and 
little else to relieve the monotony of this grim colonial life. For all these rea-
sons, Saintoyant wrote, the Frenchmen stationed there “live in a state of nerv-
ous exhaustion that deprives them of the level-headedness required for good 
public administration”. Not only did this situation “destroy the cadres’ phys-
ical vigor, it extinguishes their ardor to create” a well-functioning colony, 
making lapses in judgment, even criminal behavior, inevitable37.
Saintoyant did not conclude from this sorry description that colonial-
ism was a bad idea, but rather that building an empire required a huge com-
mitment of resources and that politicians in Paris were remiss in refusing to 
provide them. Aggravating the problem was the refusal by French investors 
to sink capital into the region, whose economic potential they doubted. 
Large investment banks preferred to finance government loans and railroad 
building in “semicolonies” like Russia and Turkey. They shied away from 
the actual French Empire and, in particular, from unknown places like the 
Congo38. So did potential French settlers, repelled by the Congo’s harsh cli-
mate and vast distance from France. And few French businesses showed 
interest in operating there, given the British dominance of African coastal 
trade. To lure firms to Equatorial Africa, the benefits would have to appear 
especially good.
For inspiration, French colonialists looked to the Belgian model. France’s 
Congo could not be an exact replica of the Free State, since the latter had 
become the private property of the Belgian king. But the French were attracted 
to Leopold’s method of dividing his colony into several large pieces and grant-
ing “concessionary” companies monopoly control over one or more of them. 
These monopolies had produced huge profits for a handful of Belgian firms 
and especially for the Belgian king. Perhaps they would do the same for France?
In 1899 the country’s colonial minister established forty “concessions”, 
each granting a single company the exclusive right to exploit the domain it 
received for thirty years39. The smallest concession covered 1.200 square kilo-
meters, the largest 140.000. These sizes were approximate at best; no one 
knew the Congo’s geography well enough to map the different concessions 
precisely. In fact, no one even knew exactly how big the Congo colony was. 
Large as these monopolies were, their advocates remained unsatisfied. Pro-co-
lonial journalists argued that too much land had been reserved for the natives, 
37 Saintoyant (1960): 60.
38 Coquery-Vidrovitch (1972): 62.
39 Jaugeon (1961): 366. See also Coquery-Vidrovitch (1972): ch. 2.
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who might therefore refuse to work for the companies, and that the French 
government’s 15 percent share of the companies’ profits was too high. Colo-
nialists worried about the amount of rubber growing in the colony, the declin-
ing stocks of ivory, competition from firms in the Free State, and the cost of 
exploiting what proved to be there40.
In fact, business conditions in the French Congo were not very good. To 
operate profitably in this part of the world, a firm required more than a 
monopoly over a particular piece of land, even a very large one. Concession-
ary companies needed sizable state investment in means of transport and par-
amilitary police, both of which King Leopold provided. Lacking other 
colonies to administer, the Belgian monarch could focus all of his overseas 
resources on the Free State. He built a railway from Stanley Pool to the Atlan-
tic and developed a thick apparatus of command and repression that worked 
in tandem with the different monopolistic firms.
The French government, by contrast, had created essentially no infra-
structure, save for building a modest administrative center in Brazzaville and 
staffing the major towns and a few outposts with a skeleton crew of low-rank-
ing officials. Paris proved unwilling to deploy French soldiers in the Congo, 
engaging instead a tiny force of African paramilitary policemen charged with 
overseeing more than a million square miles of land. If these problems alone 
likely doomed the colony to economic failure, two further obstacles ensured 
its financial ruin: a pitiful transport system and an inadequate supply of labor. 
The absence of an unbroken waterway to the Atlantic coast meant that human 
porters had to carry goods and supplies over long distances to reach one of the 
region’s two rivers, the Ogooué and the Alima, that flowed without obstacle 
toward an ocean port. Indigenous people shunned the exhausting, unforgiv-
ing labor of portage, and neither the colonial administration nor the compa-
nies would —or could— pay the large sums needed to recruit porters from 
other regions of Africa. To solve the manpower problem, officials regularly 
forced men to work.
Reluctant as the Congolese were to serve as porters, they proved even less 
interested in harvesting rubber, especially for the minuscule wages Europeans 
tended to pay. Leopold solved the manpower problem by using his large par-
amilitary force publique to compel indigenous people, en masse, to work. As 
Adam Hochschild has shown, the force did so at a grotesque human cost41. 
French officials and agents of the concessionary companies imitated Leop-
old’s methods of compulsion, but they lacked the means to employ them on 
40 Jaugeon (1961): 365-71.
41 Hochschild (1998): 165.
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such a large scale. As a result, economic extraction in the French Congo 
depended on the opportunistic, and often creative, use of violence —espe-
cially exemplary violence— to squeeze work out of the Congolese at the low-
est possible price.
Banking on the prospect of doing just that, groups of investors eagerly 
bought shares of stock in France’s new concessionary companies. Journalists 
extolled the supposed value of these companies, stirring a speculative interest 
in the stock. Shares of the Société de l’Ibenga, for example, doubled in value 
between late 1899 and mid-1900. But this price bubble bore little relation to 
the earnings potential of these companies, whose stock soon plummeted in 
value, leading to a great many bankruptcies42. By 1904, five years after the 
French concessions were formed, 25 percent had already ceased to exist. As 
for the remaining companies’ financial performance, together, they lost nearly 
10 million francs between 1899 and 190443.
Such miserable performance added to the French government’s troubles 
once news of the Congo scandal leaked out. Political leaders understood that 
violence and the threat of violence alone kept the concessionary system from 
collapsing altogether. But for obvious reasons, they could never admit as 
much. The government’s best hope was to narrowly restrict the flow of infor-
mation to the Brazza commission, limit the depth and duration of its inquiry, 
and keep its findings, certain to include some uncomfortable revelations, con-
fidential. Unfortunately for the governing elite, enterprising journalists made 
extensive use of anonymous sources whose revelations kept the Congo scan-
dal very much alive, even after the commission left for Africa in April 1905.
A retired concessionary company manager told France’s fourth-larg-
est-selling paper, Le Journal, that his firm routinely forced Africans to deliver 
ivory and rubber to them by “tying them down and whipping them 50 times 
with a chicotte” —a cruelly ingenious lash made of raw, sun-dried hippopot-
amus hide, twisted to form hundreds of razor-sharp spokes. “After each blow, 
the victims screamed in pain, their blood spurting out”. The next day, “they 
returned with ivory and rubber”. Le Journal ’s source also claimed to have fre-
quently seen the companies’ armed agents “enter into villages, where they 
forced terrorized blacks to give them their ivory”. The Africans received not a 
sou in payment, a common practice, the former official said44. Worse, another 
popular paper not only confirmed the prevalence of such extortion and theft 
but also reported, “The administration [of the colony] tolerated such things; 
42 Ibid., 62-65; Jaugeon (1961): 375-384.
43 Jaugeon (1961): 411.
44 Le Journal, 28 April 1905.
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judicial officials left them unpunished; and successive [colonial] governors hid 
them from authorities in Paris”45.
With reports such as these persistently being leaked, the colonial ministry 
must have been horrified when Challaye’s detailed and compelling dispatches 
began to appear in Le Temps. The special correspondent, who doubled as Braz-
za’s personal secretary for the mission, was a socialist openly hostile to the con-
cessionary companies and suspicious from the outset of France’s Congolese 
regime. It is unclear why Le Temps hired him, but impressive that it did. His 
remarkable series of articles, written between April and September 1905, added 
to the explorer’s legend and, most important, confirmed the extent of French 
abuses in the Congo. Challaye also made a notable contribution to French travel 
literature, painting perhaps the best portrait to date of equatorial Africa, 
albeit replete with the era’s racial stereotypes. Other members of the Brazza 
commission wrote about the Congolese mission, but without Challaye’s jour-
nalistic flair and his front-page access to the mainstream press.
In many ways, Challaye’s narrative followed the pattern of the travel 
writing he knew very well. “Sitting in front of my tent”, Challaye tells his 
readers early on, “I read Stanley’s book, Across the Dark Continent”. He then 
reproduced many of the most familiar European images of Africa and pre-
sented them as “a series of spectacles —the most colorful, animated, amusing 
spectacles I’ve ever seen— spectacles that follow one another without any 
apparent link, just like in a dream”46.
For Challaye, as for Joseph Conrad and so many others, Africa’s shim-
mering exotic dream would gradually morph into a gruesome nightmare as 
he traveled into the “savage” midsection of the continent. Returning to 
Europe in 1898, Charles Castellani, Challaye’s French predecessor in Equato-
rial Africa, felt as though he had just emerged from a “nightmare”, from hor-
rific visions that had taken him to the very “vestibule of death”47. In Challaye’s 
socialist-inflected telling, the nightmare had as much to do with the evils of 
French colonialism as with Africa itself. Even so, the young French philoso-
pher escaped few of the era’s standard images of the Dark Continent. His dis-
patches reproduced Conrad’s portrait of Africa as a trip not just into uncharted 
recesses of space but into the distant mists of time48. “On the banks of the 
Congo”, Challaye wrote, “we relive an age anterior even to prehistoric times”49. 
45 Le Soir, 15 October 1905.
46 Chayalle in Le Temps, 27 May 1905.
47 Castellani, in L’Illustration, 2 April 1898.
48 Pratt (1992); Cohen (1980), and Youngs (1994).
49 Chayalle (1909): 59.
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Like most other European travelers, Challaye portrayed Africans as animalis-
tic, the women parading naked and unashamed50.
Beyond his stock images of African women, Challaye also found canni-
balism everywhere he went. “One finds no gray hair, no senility and no blind-
ness: children eat their parents at the first sign of decline”. As for intelligence 
and maturity, Challaye found little of either. “The black man”, he wrote, “can 
be compared to a young child and even to an animal, so narrow is his psycho-
logical life”. They think only of the here and now, preoccupied as they are by 
the “satisfaction of physical needs” and especially “sexual pleasure”. All this, 
Challaye hastened to add, is no reason to despise them or take advantage of 
their primitive brains. And it was wrong, he maintained, to impose hard, dis-
ciplined work on “races accustomed since time immemorial to do nothing”51.
This conclusion prepared Challaye’s readers for a detailed exposé of the 
atrocities committed or tolerated by French officials. The first hints of those 
atrocities surfaced during a bizarre “native dance” staged for the Europeans’ 
benefit. Brazza saw in that dance “a symbolic representation of the Calvary 
the inhabitants of this region had had to suffer”. Strangely, Challaye fails to 
mention an element of this scene reported by another member of the commis-
sion, an inspecteur des colonies named Saurin. According to him, Brazza also 
understood from the dance that a great many villagers had recently been 
taken captive. Questioning the local administrator, who had hoped to hide 
this crime, Brazza found evidence of a nearby “concentration camp” with 119 
women and children held hostage under miserable conditions52. The women 
appeared to have been raped, and press accounts depicted them as suffering 
from venereal diseases contracted from their captors.
The dance scene, occurring on June 30, 1905, constitutes the turning 
point of Challaye’s story53. Over the following six weeks, Brazza would 
uncover the full extent of the crimes and horrors that had turned his once 
peaceful colony into a grotesque hell on earth. The 119 hostages represented 
in the dance were at least still alive; descending further toward Bangui, Brazza 
unearthed a history that had not ended so well. In the town of Mongoumba, 
just south of Bangui, the commissioners discovered that members of the 
50 Ibid.: 74-75.
51 Chayalle (1909): 156, 160-61.
52 L’Humanité, 27 September 1905; Coquery-Vidrovitch (1972): 176.
53 There is a discrepancy between Challaye’s report and the ones cited by Coquery-Vi-
drovitch (1972): 176 n3. Challaye has the native dance taking place on 30 June and 
mentions nothing about the concentration camp. Coquery-Vidrovitch dates the 
dance to 15 July.
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colony’s paramilitary regional guard had “brutalized the natives and taken 
advantage of the women they desired”54. Terrified, the villagers began to flee 
across the river into the Congo Free State.
Desperate to collect a quantity of rubber before everyone left, the top 
colonial official in the region had his guards seize fifty-eight women and ten 
children from the different villages. He agreed to release them only after 
their husbands and fathers paid the elevated taxes he had imposed on them 
in the form of rubber. The chief of one village had his mother, two wives, 
and two children taken by the guardsmen, who locked them and sixty-three 
other hostages in a building in Mongoumba. Male villagers then began to 
deliver the rubber required of them, which the colonial official immediately 
handed over to an agent for the local concessionary company. (Companies 
gave the colonial government cash in exchange for rubber). Weighing the 
product collected, the government agent judged the quantity too small; he 
decided not to release the hostages, taking them back to Bangui. There, he 
locked all sixty-eight in a windowless hut six meters long and four meters 
wide. During their first twelve days in captivity, twenty-five hostages died, 
their bodies dumped in the river. Several days later, a doctor, newly arrived 
in the town, heard cries and moans coming from the hut. He pushed open 
the door and to his horror found a small number of skeletally thin women 
and children barely alive amid the stench of dead bodies and human excre-
ment. “The skin was peeling away”, wrote Dr. Fulconis, “muscles atrophied, 
intelligence gone, movement and speech no longer possible”55. Of the six-
ty-eight hostages originally squeezed into the makeshift prison, only twen-
ty-one had survived. One of the women gave birth before passing away, and 
a woman survivor adopted her child. “In this horrible drama”, Challaye 
wrote, “it was the women cannibals who gave the cruel white men a lesson 
in humanity”56.
After freeing the survivors, the young doctor notified the colonial 
administration of the atrocities he had seen. The court in Brazzaville took up 
the case, only to dismiss it on grounds of insufficient evidence. The lone action 
taken was to transfer the administrator responsible for the hostage taking. He 
was, however, moved from the outback of Bangui to the capital city of Braz-
zaville, where everyone wanted to be. Having uncovered this atrocity, Brazza 
and his colleagues proceeded to accumulate evidence of one chilling abuse 
after the other. “The book one needs to reread here”, Challaye remarked, “is 
54 Chayalle (1909): 102.
55 Fabre (1999): 265.
56 Chayalle (1909): 104.
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Dante’s Inferno”57. Shortly before the Brazza commission left for Africa, the 
colonial ministry shipped Toqué to Brazzaville, hoping that the proceedings 
against him would occur offstage, outside the French press’s range. Officials 
did not expect that Challaye, as special correspondent for Le Temps, would be 
on the spot. The young philosopher was in fact the only journalist to cover the 
trial; his dispatches stood as the lone public account of the event.
Both Toqué and Gaud faced charges of murdering or ordering the mur-
ders of several Congolese men and women. The two defendants denied all 
accusations leveled by Africans, admitting wrongdoing only when a Euro-
pean, including either Toqué or Gaud, had endorsed or brought a charge. 
Since Toqué had himself accused his colleague of blowing up the African, 
Pakpa, Gaud could not deny responsibility. He did, however, claim that 
Toqué had told him to execute the man. Asked why he had used dynamite, 
his only response was that he had a few sticks in his hut and thought they 
would work well as a method of execution. In the pretrial phase, Gaud had 
testified that death by dynamite would be an ideal form of exemplary vio-
lence. The natives would see Pakpa’s demise as a magical, divine intervention, 
something that would instill fear in their hearts and prevent future rebellions. 
So he hung the dynamite around Pakpa’s neck, lit the fuse, and the man 
exploded. “Gaud recounted his crime”, Challaye wrote, “with a stupefy-
ing calm”58.
On the witness stand, Toqué confirmed what he had said during the pre-
trial investigation. His superiors had told him that nothing was more impor-
tant than recruiting porters and collecting taxes. Finding the natives unwilling 
to work or pay imposts voluntarily, Toqué sent his agents to round up porters 
by force and take their wives and children hostage. Members of the regional 
guards routinely raped the women hostages, many of whom later died, along 
with their children, of hunger and disease. Toqué testified that he believed 
himself authorized to render justice and even execute Africans he judged 
guilty of rebellion or insubordination. When he told his superior that he had 
summarily shot a “rebel” named Pikamandji, Toqué claimed his boss had 
replied, “You have done the right thing; in the future keep such information 
to yourself”59. Only later would the younger man be charged with murder.
After hearing all the testimony, the court took a full day to reach a ver-
dict. It declared Toqué guilty as an accomplice to murder and Gaud guilty of 
murder without premeditation. In both cases, the court found “extenuating 
57 Ibid.: 107.
58 Ibid.: 121.
59 Ibid.: 115.
128 EDWARD BERENSON
Historia y Política, 39, enero-junio (2018), pp. 109-138
circumstance”, sentencing the pair to five years in prison. Most white resi-
dents of Brazzaville found the penalty outrageously harsh. “Accustomed to 
treating blacks as machines or slaves”, Challaye wrote, “to exploiting them 
and abusing them, they [the white population] were amazed that anyone 
could judge the lives of these ‘dirty niggers’ so valuable”60. On leaving the 
courtroom, the journalist heard a young civil servant cry out: “It’s as if we 
have been naturalized as niggers”61.
Challaye’s observations about the trial and his revelations of atrocities 
and colonial abuse turned him against the existing regime in the Congo. But 
he nonetheless retained his allegiance to the most fundamental ideological 
pillar of the French colonial system, the mission civilisatrice. For him, it was 
the hero Brazza who incarnated and legitimized that mission. Brazza’s was 
“the only form of colonialism compatible with a democracy such as ours, a 
democracy that civilizes and liberates”. His successors had allowed his achieve-
ments to collapse, leaving an angry and terrified population that no longer 
recognized the greatness of French civilization. Whether Challaye believed a 
new civilizing mission could have redeemed the Congo is unclear, but given 
the views of other socialists at the time, it’s likely he did. Only in the 1930s 
did Challaye become an ardent opponent of colonialism in all its forms62.
As for Brazza, he was destined to die on the continent long dear to his 
heart. He became so sick on the last leg of the journey back to Brazzaville that 
he could barely stand up. He forced himself, Challaye writes, to hold one final 
meeting with Gentil, who appeared increasingly evasive, increasingly unwill-
ing to let Brazza’s commission do its work. In a letter written just before his 
return trip home, Brazza claimed that Gentil had attempted to block his 
efforts at every turn. In the Ubangi-Chari region, where Brazza had discov-
ered “the destruction pure and simple of the population”, local officials, 
doubtless acting on the governor’s orders, “went to great lengths to prevent 
me from seeing what had happened in the past and especially what is going 
on now”63. Brazza could understand why: he found evidence of serious abuses 
committed even after his commission had sailed for Africa. Worse, he had 
caught the commissaire general in an outright lie. Although Gentil had loudly 
60 Ibid.: 139.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid. 150. On Challaye’s opposition late in life to colonialism, see Irvine (2007): 144.
63 Brazza’s fellow commissioner Hoarau Desruisseaux had earlier written him that 
Gentil “has assiduously blocked our investigation. He has created one obstacle after 
the other and refuses to give us the documents we have requested”. Saintoyant 
(1960): 175.
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announced the end of portage, the commission saw that it had continued 
even more ruinously than before. Brazza’s conclusion was that Gentil should 
be removed from office. “I return home”, Brazza wrote, “with the belief that 
my mission was necessary. Without it, we would have had a scandal on our 
hands worse… than those of the Belgians”.
After locking horns one last time with Gentil, Brazza headed back across 
Stanley Pool and down to the Atlantic coast via the Belgian railway. His 
illness became so severe on the steamship home that he was taken ashore at 
Dakar, where he died on 14 September 1905. The explorer, Challaye wrote, 
was so brokenhearted by what he had seen in the Congo, so upset over the 
ruin of the great humane colony he had built, that he could no longer soldier 
on. Having presciently refused early on to serve King Leopold, he had been 
horrified to discover in the French Congo the same evils that shamed its Bel-
gian neighbor. Brazza’s “heroic sorrow”, Challaye wrote, “his sublime sadness, 
sapped his strength and hastened his death”64. He died a martyr to the mis-
sion civilisatrice.
Brazza had long been portrayed as a martyr, working selflessly and at the 
cost of his health and well-being to create a great empire for France. His death 
allowed this figurative martyrdom to come true. The great man, this “laic 
missionary” and “apostle” of freedom, wrote the Petit Parisien’s Lucien Vrily, 
had anticipated, even embraced, his sacrifice to a larger cause. Before leaving 
for the Congo, he had told the journalist, “I will happily surrender all my 
remaining strength” to prevent the moral ruin of the colony65. In announcing 
Brazza’s death, the mass-circulation press and pictorial weeklies depicted the 
martyr in quasi-religious terms. They showed a saintlike, emaciated Brazza 
being helped toward his deathbed. Photographs pictured him lying there, his 
withered face looking old far beyond his fifty-three years, his blank eyes about 
to close for good. Brazza’s biographer and brother-in-law, Jacques de Cham-
brun, later put these pictures to words: “Those who kneel before his emaciated 
body, stretched out on the whiteness of a small narrow bed, were struck by the 
expression on his features seemingly frozen in anguish. Suddenly, they per-
ceived a new look to this face they all had known for so long. No longer was 
it the face of a hero; it was the face of a martyr”66.
Brazza had hoped that the prestige of his name would add strength to 
his findings and move the Republic to make amends. Now his fame would 
have to exert a posthumous force. Colonial Minister Clémentel, who had 
64 Chayalle (1909): 147.
65 PP, 16 September 1905.
66 Chambrun (1930): 252.
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never wanted the truth of the Congo to come out, decided to play down Braz-
za’s findings, even while associating himself —and France as a whole— with 
the saintliness and martyrdom of the great man. With Brazza out of the pic-
ture, the colonial minister appears to have decided on a three-pronged strat-
egy: extol the martyr Brazza, silence the returning members of his commission, 
and bring Gentil to Paris to defend his colonial administration. In the short 
run, the strategy did not work. A member of Brazza’s commission gave copies 
of documents and other information to the prominent writer Robert de Jou-
venel, who then leaked this material, much of it written by Brazza himself, to 
the press67. The explorer’s notes sharply criticized Gentil, whom he accused of 
heinous crimes. Brazza charged not only that Gentil had been complicit in 
the Congo’s atrocities but that he had committed many himself.
The popular press jumped on the sensational new controversy, creating 
another episode in the ongoing Congo scandal. What could be juicier than a 
set of disturbing accusations coming “from beyond the grave”, as one paper 
put it? According to “an individual well placed for being perfectly informed 
[Jouvenel]”, Brazza had explicitly charged that Gentil’s demands for ever 
increasing tax receipts and a huge force of porters had led to the hostage 
camps, the burning of villages, and the constant native rebellions, all repressed 
with excessively harsh tactics. Worse, Brazza’s occult voice was now accusing 
Gentil of having personally “chicotted” a Gabonese man to death. Gentil had 
also ordered a woman flogged and then hung by her feet and several others 
whipped severely and placed in irons for theft and other petty crimes. Sum-
marizing this damning information, the Petit Parisien’s article gave what it 
said was a direct quote from Brazza: “Tortures and summary judgments pro-
liferated. M. Gentil paraded through the streets with a personal bodyguard 
whose members whipped people who failed to salute the Governor”68. Such 
quotations seemed all the more eerily real when Brazza’s letter, mentioned 
above, surfaced in Le Temps the following day (September 27).
These accusations against Gentil turned the scandal into an “affair” 
when the commissaire and his associates, having returned to France a few 
days earlier, adamantly rejected Brazza’s charges, accusing commission mem-
bers of spreading outright lies. The commissaire’s men hesitated to criticize 
the martyred Brazza directly, focusing their attack on other members of the 
commission, said to be “determined adversaries” prejudiced against Gentil 
from the start. The commissaire’s associates implied that Brazza was too ill to 
conduct a genuine investigation of his own, so he took as gospel the 
67 Le Matin and Le Journal, 27-28 September 1905.
68 PP, 26 September 1905.
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falsehoods circulated by members of his group, and accepted suspect native 
testimony at face value. Since even a socialist like Challaye believed that 
blacks routinely made things up, the colonialists around Gentil knew they 
could cast doubt on Brazza’s report by impugning his native sources69. If Gen-
til had at times been involved in violent conflict, said his chief of staff, M. Pel-
letier, it was only in the context of warfare against native rebels trying to 
overthrow French colonial authority70.
In a series of interviews with the press, Pelletier denied that many of the 
now notorious atrocities attributed to mid-level French colonial administra-
tors and indirectly to Gentil had actually occurred. According to Pelletier, the 
case of the sixty-eight women and children found in a concentration camp, 
many of them dead, had nothing to do with Europeans; it was a wholly Afri-
can affair. In Pelletier’s account, members of an enemy tribe had kidnapped 
the victims in question after eating several others. Those kept alive were to be 
used as slaves71. In other, similar accounts, Gentil’s surrogates attempted to 
explain away most of the cruelties attributed to the French. This tactic, com-
bined with the widespread belief that African testimony could not be trusted, 
raised doubts not only about the information leaked from the Brazza docu-
ments but also about all prior reports of French abuses. Had Brazza still been 
alive, his fame and personal reputation might have enabled him to foil these 
efforts, but without him, Gentil and his allies in the colonial ministry could 
circulate a counternarrative designed to discredit the leaks coming from the 
commission of inquiry.
With two opposing explanations of the Congo situation, centering on a 
pair of antagonists, one deceased, the press polemic —and the affaire it had 
generated— continued unabated. Most vocal were the conservative newspa-
pers and the socialist L’Humanité, which proved as thorough as it was relent-
less. L’Humanité ’s Gustave Rouanet, who represented the Seine Department 
in the National Assembly, did an extraordinary job of investigating the Congo 
affair. He obtained access to the Brazza commission’s notes and found many 
sources willing to reveal what they knew. Beginning in late September 1905, 
Rouanet wrote no fewer than twenty-nine articles on La Barbarie Coloniale, 
almost one a day72. Taken together, his pieces constitute a masterpiece of 
advocacy journalism and the effective use of anonymous sources. The portrait 
69 See the polemic on the truthfulness of Africans in L’Humanité, 30 September-1 
October 1905.
70 Le Temps, 27 September 1905.
71 La Liberté, 2 October 1905.
72 Fabre (1999): 256.
132 EDWARD BERENSON
Historia y Política, 39, enero-junio (2018), pp. 109-138
he painted was devastating, not just for individuals like Toqué and Gentil but 
for the colonial system itself, Rouanet’s real target. His articles would have 
been more influential had they appeared in a mainstream newspaper, and the 
intensity of his critique may have alarmed papers like Le Temps and the Petit 
Parisien, whose journalists had already revealed much of what Rouanet would 
say, if in less detail. The editors of these two papers likely felt uncomfortable 
with the socialist writer now repeating, and reinforcing, what they had pub-
lished. Shortly after Rouanet’s series began, Le Temps and the Petit Parisien 
backed off, leaving L’Humanité to face Gentil’s counterattack largely alone. 
The socialists remained marginal enough in 1905 that opponents could dis-
miss their journalism on ideological grounds, without having to prove their 
information wrong.
Under these circumstances, Colonial Minister Clémentel decided to 
cool things down by announcing the formation of a new commission of 
inquiry. Its task would be to evaluate the respective claims of the two sides 
and recommend any reforms that might be needed. Jean-Marie de Lanessan, 
the former governor-general of Indochina and minister of colonies, chaired 
the group, and his collaborators included a well-known academic and several 
high-level civil servants from Clémentel’s ministry, all favorable to Gentil73. It 
is unclear exactly how Lanessan’s panel did its work, but most members 
seemed eager to challenge Brazza’s view that the origins of the Congo atroci-
ties lay in the structure of France’s colonial organization, especially as directed 
by Gentil. Lanessan’s 120-page report followed to the letter Clémentel’s orig-
inal instructions to the Brazza commission: the abuses, deplorable as they 
were, resulted from the isolated acts of errant individuals. The colonial system 
itself was not to blame, nor was Gentil, whose career emerged from the sec-
ond inquiry completely intact.
If the government found itself exculpated by the committee its leaders 
had named, the same was not true of the concessionary companies, whose 
operations, already compromised by market forces, Lanessan called into ques-
tion. Even though his report explicitly —and repeatedly— pinned the blame 
on a few individuals, a close reading of the text suggests that the former min-
ister had indeed found structural reasons for the Congo’s problems. Those 
reasons were solely economic; the government bore no responsibility for the 
colony’s ills, though it did hold the keys to their resolution. The concessionary 
companies, Lanessan wrote, had been a bad idea, and the government should 
allow no more. In the meantime, the National Assembly would have to fund 
the Congo more generously, and above all, the Republic would need to 
73 Brunschwig (1977): 123-124.
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redouble its devotion to the mission civilisatrice. The colonial government, 
committed as always to the well-being and advancement of the native people, 
would have to protect the Congolese from exploitation. It must provide food, 
education, and medical care and ensure that natives living outside the conces-
sionary zone could freely sell the products they raised74.
What the Lanessan report ignored was the close structural relationship 
between the colonial government and the concessionary economy. Both the 
local administration and the companies required indigenous people to pro-
vide labor and tax payments, neither of which the Congolese wanted to give. 
The only way to obtain the manpower needed for portage and harvesting rub-
ber was to compel people to work. The assessment of taxes served as a crucial 
means of compulsion, but it was rarely enough. Authorities continued to 
recruit porters by force, and the Congolese continued to flee from recruiters 
into the brush, where they not infrequently starved to death. When colonial 
officials finally built roads and introduced automobiles during the Great War, 
the need for porters declined. But the humanitarian situation improved only 
briefly; throughout the 1920s, railway construction led to the massive, forci-
ble conscription of labor. Local people fled from the recruiters or rebelled 
against them, reproducing the same kinds of abuses Brazza had found dec-
ades earlier75.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Despite its flaws, the Lanessan report, with its explicit, if muted, criti-
cism of the concessionary companies, went further than the government 
wanted to go; officials at the Foreign Ministry forbade its publication. They 
feared it would give ammunition to France’s colonial rivals and open the gov-
ernment to lawsuits from the companies. Despite the efforts of socialists and 
left-leaning Radicals like Joseph Caillaux, who wanted full disclosure of both 
the Lanessan text and the Brazza commission’s notes, the Assembly ultimately 
voted overwhelmingly to keep everything secret. Only ten copies of the 
Lanessan report saw print, and all ten were consigned to the archives, where 
they remain today76.
It is, of course, impossible to know what would have happened had 
Brazza been able to return home bearing his findings. In the past, he had been 
74 Ibid. 126-27.
75 Coquery-Vidrovitch (1972): 176-95 and Gide (1927).
76 Autin (1985): 262-264. The Lanessan report was finally published in Bellec (2014).
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an effective publicist, and the colonial ministry would have found it extremely 
difficult to dismiss him and his devastating observations. As a national hero 
and charismatic personality, he would have caught the interest of the mass 
press, which would have given him a great deal of attention. The scandal 
would have remained alive, and the Congo might have enjoyed some genuine 
reforms, the colonial system itself perhaps called into question. This is why 
the Colonial Ministry had been so upset by Brazza’s appointment to head the 
commission of inquiry and why the minister and his associates had worked 
exceedingly hard to circumscribe the commission’s activities. Brazza was con-
sidered so dangerous that his wife, Thérèse, who had traveled with him on the 
final African trip, believed to the end of her days that her husband had not 
died from dysentery. He had been poisoned, she maintained, to silence him 
and bury his findings77.
With Brazza dubbed a martyr and out of the picture, his opponents 
ignored his troublesome, divisive conclusions and diverted attention to the 
unifying, patriotic themes he and his friends had so carefully nurtured during 
his lifetime. “He was a conqueror”, proclaimed Le Matin, “but one who con-
quered with kindness”78. Brazza had always rallied a great many French men 
and women around his image as selfless patriot and intrepid explorer; political 
leaders now sought to use that image to overcome the divisions the Congo 
scandal had caused.
What better way to accomplish that goal than a great national commun-
ion around the fallen hero lying serenely in state? With fanfare and éclat, the 
French government organized an impressive public funeral for Brazza, a 
national event of the kind usually reserved for presidents, prime ministers, 
and luminaries like Victor Hugo79. On October 3, 1905, virtually the entire 
French elite thronged the Church of Sainte Clotilde, sumptuously decorated 
in black and white. Government ministers, business leaders, military figures, 
high civil servants, celebrities, and socialites representing the “tout Paris” all 
came to pay their respects80. People who rarely associated with one another 
rubbed shoulders as they strained to glimpse the ornate coffin of the great 
man and martyr to France. Such was the national unity expressed in the 
Church of Sainte Clotilde that clericals and secularists, putting aside their 
feud over the separation of church and state, pressed together to hear the 
77 Ibid.: 256; Pucci (2009): 188, writes, “To this day, the question of Brazza’s death has 
remained unresolved”.
78 Le Matin, 16 September 1905.
79 Ben-Amos (1997 and 2000).
80 Martin (2005): 210.
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Reverend Father Leroy extol the Catholic virtues of Savorgnan de Brazza81. 
For one day, at least, conflicts seemed forgotten as the country drew together 
around the hero’s casketed body.
After representatives of the French army, resplendent in their full dress 
uniforms, gave an elaborate military salute, a long funeral procession set out 
for the Père Lachaise Cemetery, where Brazza would be lowered into his 
in-laws’ tomb. En route, thousands of ordinary Parisians poured out of their 
homes and businesses to pay the hero their last respects. “The entire nation is 
in mourning”, declared Le Journal, “when a great man like M. de Brazza 
draws his final breath”82.
At the gravesite, four eulogies contributed to the secular beatification of 
the French martyr; all emphasized national unity, the civilizing mission, and 
Brazza’s benevolent “conquête pacifique”. Brazza’s work, intoned the colonial-
ist deputy Paul Deschanel “is pure of human blood”. His heroism, Deschanel 
added, had “widened [France’s] borders” and made him “the brilliant artisan 
of justice and France’s ideals”83. Brazza, in short, had served as exemplar of 
the mission civilisatrice, the man whose explorations had enabled France to 
illuminate the Dark Continent with the radiance of its superior form of life. 
The unspoken subtext of this speech was that Brazza embodied the true 
nature of French colonialism. French men and women should think of “him” 
and not the dynamiters and the decapitators of colonized peoples when they 
seek to understand the meaning and value of French imperial expansion.
More than anyone else, Colonial Minister Clémentel associated the 
French Republic and its empire with the prestige and reputation of the fallen 
hero. Clémentel asserted that far from harming the Congolese, France, like 
Brazza, had sacrificed to make them civilized and free. The explorer’s recent 
mission to the Congo, he declared, had “consolidated our moral credit”. No 
one more than Brazza, the minister continued, “incarnates the France of lib-
erty and civilization” or prevented his compatriots from ever doubting “the 
eternal traditions of justice and humanity that are the glory of France”84. Hav-
ing buried the explorer’s report, Clémentel deftly used Brazza’s image as char-
ismatic hero and martyr to obscure what the explorer had wanted to expose85.
81 Bauberot (2004).
82 Le Journal, 4 October 1905.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Although the government suppressed Brazza’s draft report, it is clear from the writings 
of those who accompanied him to the French Congo in 1905 that his findings con-
demned the very structure of the colonial regime. Saintoyant (1960) and Brisch (1906).
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With the ceremony concluded, the Congo scandal quickly faded away. 
Neither L’Humanité ’s well-documented articles, nor an elaborate parliamentary 
debate could revive it. In the end, the scandal had served not to challenge deeply 
held French values, but to affirm them. It reinforced the widespread notion that 
France’s colonial project was noble and good. The Congo scandal had proved to 
be one of those wrenching public phenomena that ultimately brings people 
together rather than pulling them apart. Such was the unifying power of Braz-
za’s pubic image that political leaders could use it to create common perceptions 
diametrically at odds with what the explorer had ultimately wanted to say.
Bibliography
Ambroise-Rendu, A. (2004). Petits récits des désordres ordinaries. Paris: Seli Arslan.
Auchair, G. (1982). Le mana quotidian: Structures et functions de la chronique des faits divers. 
Paris: Editions anthropos.
Autin, J. (1985). Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza: un prophète du tiers monde. Paris: Perrin.
Barthes, R. (1964). Structure du fait divers. In R. Barthes. Essais critiques. Paris: Seuil.
Bauberot, J. (2004). Laïcité 1905-2005: Entre passion et raison. Paris: Seuil.
Bellec, D. (2014). Le rapport Brazza: mission d’enquête du Congo: rapport et documents (1905-
1907). Neuville-en-Champagne: Passager clandestin.
Ben-Amos, A. (1997). Les Funérailles de Victor Hugo. In P. Nora (ed.). Les lieux de mémoire. 
Paris: Gallimard.
   (2000). Funerals, Politics, and Memory in Modern France. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Berenson, E. (1992). The Trial of Madame Caillaux. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Blic, D. de (2005a). Le scandale comme épreuve. Politix, 71, 9-38. Available at: https://doi.
org/10.3917/pox.071.0009.
   (2005b). Moraliser l’argent: Ce que Panama a changé dans la société française 
(1889-1897). Politix, 71, 61-82. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3917/pox.071.0061.
Brower, B. (2009). A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the Algerian 
Sahara, 1844-1902. New York: Columbia University Press.
Brunschwig, H. (1977). Brazza et le Scandale du Congo françis (1904-1906). Bulletin des 
séances de l’academie Royale des sciences d’outre-mer, 23, 112-129.
Challaye, F. (1909). Le Congo français. Paris: Félix Alcan.
Chambrun, C. de (1930). Brazza. Paris: Plon.
Cohen, W. B. (1980). The French Encounter with Africans. Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press.
Conklin, A. (1997). Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West 
Africa, 1895-1930. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Cookey, S. (1966). The Concession Policy in the French Congo and the British Reaction, 
1898-1906. Journal of African History, 7 (2), 263-64. Available at: https://doi.org/ 
10.1017/S0021853700006319.
THE POLITICS OF ATROCITY: THE SCANDAL IN THE FRENCH CONGO (1905) 137
Historia y Política, 39, enero-junio (2018), pp. 109-138
Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. (1972). Le Congo au temps des grandes companies concessionnaires. 
Paris: Mouton.
Dampierre, E. de (1954). Thèmes pour l’étude du scandal. Annales E.S.C., IX, 328-336.
Dwyer, P. and Nettlebeck, A. (2018). Violence, Colonialism, and Empire in the Modern World. 
Palgrave MacMillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62923-0.
Fabre, R. (1999). Gustave Rouanet et les obscures espérances: Les socialistes et l’affaire du 
Congo 1905-1906. In V. F. Duclert. Avenirs et avant-gardes en France, XIXe-XXe siècle: 
Hommage à Madeleine Rebérioux (pp. 251-266). Paris: La Découverte.
Gide, A. (1927). Voyage au Congo. Paris: Gallimard.
Girardet, R. (1972). L’ idée coloniale en France. Paris: La Table ronde.
Hochschild, A. (1998). King Leopold’s Ghost. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Irvine, W. (2007). Between Politics and Justice: La Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, 1898-1945. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Jaugeon, R. (1961). Les Sociétés d’exploitation au Congo et l’opinion française de 1890-1906. 
Revue d’ histoire de l’Outre-Mer, 48, 353-437. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3406/
outre.1961.1339.
Kalifa, D. (1995). L’encre et le sang: Récits de crimes et société à la Belle Epoque. Paris: Fayard.
Louis, W. R. (1968). E. D. Morel’s History of the Congo Reform Movement. Oxford: Claren-
don Press.
Louis, W. R. and Stengers, J. (1968). E. D. Morel’s History of the Congo Reform Movement. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lull, J. A. (1997). Media Scandals: Morality and Desire in the Popular Culture Marketplace. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Mahieu, M. (2006). Monseigneur Augouard: Un poitevin roi du Congo. La Crèche: Geste 
editions.
Martin, J. (2005). Savorgnan de Brazza, 1852-1905. Paris: Les Indes savantes.
Mille, P. (1905). Le Congo Léopoldien. Paris: Cahiers de la quinzaine.
Morel, E. (1903). The British Case in the French Congo. London: Heinemann.
   (1904). King Leopold’s Rule in Africa. London: Heinemann.
Perrot, M. (1983). Fait divers et histoire au XIXe siècle. Annales E.S.C., 38 (4), 911-919. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.3406/ahess.1983.410967.
Pratt, M. L. (1992). Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. New York: Rout-
ledge. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203163672.
Pucci, I. (2009). Brazza in Congo. New York: Umbrage.
Saintoyant, J. (1960). L’Affaire du Congo. Paris: Editions Epi.
Stoler, A. L. (2002). Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial 
Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Thérenty, M.-E. (2007). La littérature au quotidien: Poétiques journalistiques au XIXe siècle. 
Paris: Seuil. Available at: https://doi.org/10.14375/NP.9782020947336.
Thomas, M. (2012). The French Colonial Mind, Volume 2: Violence, Military Encounters, and 
Colonialism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Thompson, J. B. (2000). Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age. Cambridge, 
UK: Polity Press.
Toqué, G. (1996). Les massacres du Congo. Paris: L’Harmattan.
138 EDWARD BERENSON
Historia y Política, 39, enero-junio (2018), pp. 109-138
West, R. (1973). European Exploration and Exploitation in French Equatorial Africa. Newton 
Abbot: Victorian Book Club.
White, O. (1999). Children of the French Empire: Miscegenation and Colonial Society in French 
West Africa, 1895-1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://
doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198208198.001.0001.
Witte, J. de (1924). Un explorateur et un apôtre du Congo français: Monseigneur Augouard, 
archevêque titulaire de Cassiopée, vicaire apostolique du Congo français. Paris: Emile-
Paul frères.
Youngs, T. (1994). Travelers in Africa. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
